萨姆·佩尔兹曼
| 萨姆·佩尔兹曼 | |
|---|---|
| 出生 | 布鲁克林区  |
| 母校 | |
| 职业 | 大學教師、经济学家 |
| 雇主 | |
| 奖项 | 科睿唯安引文桂冠獎 |
萨姆·佩尔兹曼（Sam Peltzman），是芝加哥大学布斯商学院名誉教授。佩尔兹曼是《法律与经济学期刊》的编辑；1974年至1989年期间，亦担任《政治经济学杂志》的编辑。佩尔兹曼的研究重点是公部门和私部門之间的接口问题。
1960年，取得纽约城市学院工商管理学士；1965年，取得芝加哥大学经济学博士。
佩尔兹曼效應
[编辑]佩爾茲曼效應（英語：Peltzman effect），指企圖增加安全性的規範反而增加風險，得名自佩爾茲曼。1975年，佩尔兹曼在《汽車安全規範的效果》（The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation）中提到「因為補償非常完善，導致規範幾乎沒有減少高速公路上的死亡案例。」[1] 佩爾茲曼宣稱規範最好沒用，否則反而會引起反效果。[2][3] 佩爾茲曼效應也會導致一項重分配效果，即無辜者承擔冒險者的風險，也就是道德風險。舉例而言，對於安全帶、碰撞區、防鎖死系統等安全規範，一位能容忍高風險的駕駛會將車開得越快、越粗心，最終導致行人傷亡的增加。[4]
作品
[编辑]- "The Structure of the Money-Expenditures Relationship," American Economic Review, 1969.
- "The Effect of Government Subsidies-in-Kind on Private Expenditures: The Case of Higher Education," Journal of Political Economy, 1973.
- "The Effects of Auto Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, 1975.
- The Regulation of Automobile Safety, American Enterprise Institute, 1976.
- "The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration," Journal of Law and Economics, 1977.
- "The Growth of Government," Journal of Law and Economics, 1980.
- "The Effect of FTC Advertising Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 1981.
- "An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting," American Economic Review, 1985.
- "Economic Conditions and Gubernatorial Elections," American Economic Review, 1987.
- "How Efficient is the Voting Market?" Journal of Law and Economics, 1990.
- "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992.
- Political Participation and Government Regulation, University of Chicago Press, 1998.
- "The Decline of Antitrust Enforcement," Review of Industrial Organization, 2001.
- "Mortality Inequality," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2009.
註腳
[编辑]- ^ Peltzman, Sam. The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation. Journal of Political Economy. 1975, 83 (4): 677–726. JSTOR 1830396. S2CID 153473566. doi:10.1086/260352.
- ^ Pope, Adam T.; Tollison, Robert D. "Rubbin' is racin": evidence of the Peltzman effect from NASCAR. Public Choice. 2010, 142 (3–4): 507–513. S2CID 153527032. doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9548-2.
"The Peltzman (1975) effect predicts that when automobile safety regulations are made mandatory, at least some of their benefits will be offset by changes in the behavior of drivers
- ^ Hedlund, J. Risky business: safety regulations, risk compensation, and individual behavior. Injury Prevention. 2000, 6 (2): 82–89. PMC 1730605
. PMID 10875661. doi:10.1136/ip.6.2.82. This conclusion startled the road safety community and challenged the role of government in attempting to improve safety through regulation. In Peltzman's view, government regulation was useless and perhaps even counterproductive.
- ^ Diosdado-De-La-Pena, Maria-Paulina. Safety externalities of SUVs on passenger cars: An analysis of the Peltzman Effect using FARS data (学位论文). 2008 [2023-10-24]. （原始内容存档于2024-02-07）.
In general, safety regulation did decrease the probability of death for drivers, but this is offset by involving themselves in a riskier behavior, which reassigns the change of deaths from vehicle occupants to pedestrians
